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Marketsthat arenot completely transparent featurecomplex com-
parative staticswith respect to the e®ect of number of ¯rms, elasticity
of substitution between goods and degree of transparency on equilib-
rium prices. The main result is that the following 'common wisdom'
is incorrect: more transparent markets always feature lower prices,
higher consumer welfare and lower price disperion.
1 Introduction
It is often suggested that transparency will increase competition, reduce
prices and price dispersion, and increase consumer surplus. "The internet
is a nearly perfect market because information is instantaneous and buy-
ers can compare the o®erings of sellers worldwide. The result is ¯erce price
competition", (BusinessWeek, 1998). "The Internet cuts costs, increases
competition and improves the functioning of the price mechanism. It thus
moves the economy closer to the textbook model of perfect competition.(...)
By improving the °ow of information between buyers and sellers, it makes
markets more e±cient (...) By increasing price transparency, the Internet
will give more power to the consumers " (The Economist, 2000). It is easy to
¯nd many similar assertions in both academic and more popular accounts.
In this paper we present a caveat against this argument.1 If goods are
1Empirical results are quite mixed. One of the ¯rst studies is Bailey (1998) who ¯nds
that prices for books, CDs, and software are higher on the internet than for traditional
retailers. Lee (1999) ¯nds a similar result for the market for used cars. Clay et al. (2001)
¯nd no tendency of prices of online bookstores to decrease over time. Brynjolfsson and
Smith (1999), on the other hand, found that internet retailers had lower prices for books
and CDs than conventional outlets.
1imperfect substitutes and consumers value variety, a rise in transparency
increases consumer awareness about di®erent products. This increases total
demand, and may lead to higher prices. Note that in this case prices and
welfare may move in the same direction, but the opposite canhappenas well!
Of course, this e®ect disappears if goods are perfect substitutes. Then there
is no reason for consumers to buy more products if transparency increases.
In this case we are left with the e®ect of transparency on competition: if
consumers become better informed about prices this makes demand more
elastic and decreases prices.2 Finally, if some ¯rms target the market of less
informed consumers, there is a range of values of transparency where a small
increase in transparency increases price dispersion.
We illustrate this argument with a model in which there are two types of
buyers. One type is perfectly informed about all prices o®ered by di®erent
sellers; the other type is only informed about the product and price of one
seller and is restricted to buy from this particular seller. The fraction of buy-
ers that is perfectly informed is an exogenous parameter which we take as a
measure for the level oftransparency in the market. Thus we take a short cut
on modeling the search process by which buyers become informed explicitly.3
Doing so, however, allows us to study a richer demand side. In particular,
we accommodate for decreasing (individual) demand, whereas search models
typically focus on the case of unit demand. More importantly, it allows us
to study the impact of the level of product di®erentiation. This feature of
our model is important since, as will be seen, the impact of transparency
on prices and welfare hinges crucially on the degree to which products are
substitutes.
In the next section we present our market model. Section 3 analyzes the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the model Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a market where n producers are active, 1;2;:::;n and consumers are
modelled on the unit interval [0;1]. Consumers' utility functions are of the
2Another reason why transparancy may increase prices is that it facilitates collusion.
Studies which focus on this possibility are M¿llgaard and Overgaard (2000) and Nilsson
(1999).
3This transparancy parameter in a sense captures in a reduced form the e®ect the
exogenous search cost parameters in models with endogenous search (e.g., Bakos, 1997,














where xi is the amount ofgood i (= 1;:::;n), M is a composite good of all the
other products in the economy, and ¾ indicates the degree to which goods
from di®erent producers are substitutes. We use the composite good M as
numeraire (hence the price of good M equals 1) Let a fraction ¿ of consumers
be aware of all the n products in this market. Hence, they maximize this
utility function above subject to a budget constraint. It is routine to verify
that the inverse demand functions of these informed customers are of the
form




Further, of the (1¡ ¿) other consumers, a fraction 1
n knows only of product
i and is not aware of any other product. Hence their utility function is
u(xi;M) = xi ¡ x2
i + M. The inverse demand function of an uninformed
consumer equals
pi(xi) = 1 ¡ 2xi
We say that transparency increases in this market as the fraction of people
¿ who are aware of all products increases.
Now we analyze the equilibrium in this market. In particular, we are
looking for the prices that clear the market in this context. We distinguish
twosets of ¯rms. First, there arethe ¯rmsthat produce for thewholemarket.
That is, they sell to both the 1¡¿
n consumers that only know their product
and to the ¿ consumers that know all n products. Second, there are ¯rms
that only produce for their 1¡¿
n captive consumers that are not aware of any
other product.
Starting with the group of the producers that produce for all consumers
that are aware of their products. These producers we denote by f1;2;:::;mg.
Let xj denote total output of ¯rm j 2 f1;2;:::;mg. Further, let xU
j ( xI
j )
denote ¯rm j's output per head of uninformed (informed) customers. Since
there are ¿ informed customers and 1¡¿
n uninformed customers who (only)





j = xj. Next, we assume that sellers cannot distinguish





3The second (and possibly empty) set of ¯rms is denoted fm + 1;:::;ng.
These ¯rms produce only for their captive consumers. Hence it must be the
case that informed consumers are not willing to buy from such a ¯rm.
Summarizing, we obtain the following de¯nition of a market equilibrium.
De¯nition 1 Given any vector of total outputs (x1;:::;xn) with x1 ¸ x2 ¸
::: ¸ xn, a market equilibrium is determined by the set of ¯rms f1;2;:::;mg
(with m · n) that produce for both the informed and uninformed markets,
the set of ¯rms fm+ 1;:::;ng that produce only for their uninformed market




















j = xj (3)






j > ¸pm (4)













for k = m+ 1;:::;n.
Equation (2) says that prices are equal on both market segments, and we
will refertoit as ano-arbitrage condition. Equation (3)isan accountingiden-
tity: total output xj has to be allocated over the informed and uninformed
market segments. The inequality (4) ensures that informed consumers are
willing to buy from ¯rm m but not from ¯rm m+ 1, because the marginal
value of buying good m evaluated at xI




than the price of m multiplied by ¸ (=1), the marginal value of income. If
the informed consumers ¯nd the price for product m+1 too high, they also
¯nd the price for products m0 > m + 1 too high because of the assumption
that output levels are ordered x1 ¸ x2 ¸ ::: ¸ xn. Finally, equations (5) and
(6) de¯ne the price and demand for those ¯rms that only sell to their own
captive consumers.
The following lemma gives an equivalent characterization of a market
equilibrium.
4Lemma 2 Given any vector of total outputs (x1;:::;xn) with x1 ¸ x2 ¸ ::: ¸
xn, the distribution of outputs over the informed and uninformed consumers



















j = xj (8)



















for k = m+ 1;:::;n.
Lemma 3 The following result about m will be used below and follows im-
mediately from equation (9).
Corollary 4 If x1 = x2 = ::: = xn then m = n.
So if each ¯rm produces the same amount of output, then the unique
market equilibrium is the one where all ¯rms produce for both the informed
and the uninformed market.
Lemma 5 Given the total output vector (x1;:::;xn), the market equilibrium
price for product j 2 f1;:::;mg equals





° = °(¾;¿;n;m) =
2n2¾¿
[(1¡ ¿)(1¡ ¾) + n¿][n¿ + (1¡ ¿)(1¡ ¾ + m¾)]
(10)
¯ = ¯(¾;¿;n;m) = ° +
2n(1 ¡ ¾)
(1¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ¾) +n¿
(11)
5and for product k 2 fm+ 1;:::;ng




Note that for ¿ = 1 we are back again in the usual case where ¯ = 2
and ° = 2¾. That is, if the market is perfectly transparent we get the
demand function which corresponds to the case where every consumer has
utility function (1). In particular, in that case ¯ and ° do not depend on the
number of ¯rms n and ¯ does not depend on ¾.
Also note that for the case where ¿ < 1 and goods are perfect substitutes
(¾ = 1) and where all ¯rms produce for both informed and uninformed
market segments (m = n), we get ¯ = ° = 2. So in that case ¯ and °
do not depend on ¿ nor on n. The intuition for this is important as it
explains many of the results that follow. The reason why ¯ and ° (for the
case where ¾ < 1 and m = n) depend on ¿ and n is that the ¯rm faces two
markets: one where decreasing marginal utility is strong (the uninformed
market where consumers only buy the ¯rm's own product) and one where it
is weaker (because with ¾ < 1 the informed consumers like variety and hence
are willing to consume more)4. The parameters ¿ and n determine the size
of the uninformed market, which equals 1¡¿
n . If ¾ = 1 and m = n, goods
are perfect substitutes and marginal utility decreases at the same speed in
both markets. Hence the relative sizes of these market are irrelevant. If
¾ = 1 and m < n, however, we see that ¯ (= °) decreases with ¿ and the
informed price rises with ¿ for given output levels x1;:::;xn. The intuition
is as follows. Some people buy from ¯rms that only sell on the uninformed
market segment. In other words, these consumers buy from ¯rms that charge
high prices. As ¿ increases, some of these consumers switch to sellers that
sell on both segments. For given output levels, this will cause prices to rise
on the informed market.
To see how the values of ¾ and ¿ a®ect the demand curve a ¯rm faces,
the following result derives some comparative statics properties.
Lemma 6 Changes in ¿ and ¾ have the following e®ects on the demand
curve if ¿ < 1, ¾ < 1 and m · n
4The observation that marginal utility goes down faster on the uninformed market
suggests that the ¯rm would prefer to have informed consumers only. At ¯rst sight, this
seems to contradict the idea that the ¯rm is a monopolist on the uninformed market which
makes this uninformed market more pro¯table than the informed one. The point is that
we are taking output levels x1;:::;xn ¯xed at this moment. The next section introduces
the idea that output levels are determined in Nash equilibrium. This introduces the






































First, consider the e®ect of ¿ on ¯. As ¿ increases the price of ¯rm j
decreases more slowly with a rise in j's total output level xj. When ¿ is low,
a relatively big part of j's output is sold on the uninformed market which
features strong decreasing marginal utility. Hence a small increase in total
output xj causes a big fall in pj. In other words, a big fall in the price is
needed to convince the uninformed agents to buy the additional output. As
¿ increases, more output is sold to informed agents who (with ¾ < 1) have
a taste for variety and hence are willing to absorb the increase of output xj
at a smaller price discount. That is, the price pj falls by less in response to
a rise in xj, the higher ¿ is.
As goods become closer substitutes (¾ goes up) an increase in xj leads
to a smaller fall in pj (
@¯
@¾ < 0). When goods are closer substitutes, it is
easier for the informed consumers to buy more per head from j's good and
substitute away from the competing goods. As a consequence, the decrease
in pj needed to absorb the increase in xj is moderated.
Now consider the cross-price e®ects. The e®ect of ¿ on ° is the following.
If ¿ = 0, every ¯rm serves its own uninformed market. Hence there is no
interaction between ¯rms and ° = 0: As ¿ increases there is interaction
between ¯rms and ° > 0. That is, with positive (but small) ¿, a rise in the
output level of ¯rm i reduces the equilibrium price for ¯rm j. With two ¯rms
it is, in fact, always the case that
@°
@¿ > 0. The more markets overlap, the
more the price of ¯rm j is negatively e®ected by an increase in the output
of ¯rm i. With more than two ¯rms the e®ect is reversed for relatively
high value of ¿. To absorb an an increase in xi the informed consumers will
consume less per head of the products of all the other ¯rms. If ¿ is large and
there are many ¯rms, this has a mitigating e®ect on the price decline that
¯rm j will experience from an increase in xi (
@°
@¿ < 0 for large n and large ¿).
As goods are closer substitutes the priceof ¯rmj is more strongly a®ected
by an increase in the output of ¯rm i:
@°
@¾ > 0. To absorb an increase in xi
the informed consumers will buy less from ¯rm j. This e®ect is stronger the




more strongly then, by (3), xU
j must increase more strongly. It is this increase
on the market for uninformed consumers that causes a bigger e®ect on the
price of ¯rm j.
7Now turn to the last line (c) of the lemma. This considers the case where
all ¯rms raise their output simultaneously by the amount dx. What happens
to ¯rm j's price? Clearly it is the case that
dpj
dx
= ¡(¯ + (n ¡1)°) < 0
Line (c) shows that the fall in pj is bigger the smaller is ¿, and the bigger
is ¾. The intuition for the ¯rst e®ect is that as ¿ decreases, more is sold on
the uninformed market where marginal utility decreases faster than on the
informed market. Hence a given rise dx leads to a bigger fall in prices. If ¾
is bigger, goods are closer substitutes. This implies two things. First, the
informed consumers have less taste for variety and hence prices fall faster on
the informed market. Second, the interaction between ¯rms is bigger. Both
work in the direction of a bigger fall in prices in response to dx if ¾ is higher.
From (c) we see immediately that for given output levels it is possible
that a rise in transparency increases all prices pj. If ¯rms choose symmetric
output levels, x = x1 = ::: = xn then we have pj = 1¡ (¯ +(n ¡ 1)°)x. For
given x, a rise in transparency ¿ increases prices pj. The intuition for this
e®ect is that if consumers become better informed about the availability of
goods which are imperfect substitutes thentotal demandwill increase. But if
total supply is taken as given, the market equilibrium price must increase in
order to restore the equality of demand and supply. This we call the demand
e®ect of transparency, because supply is ¯xed in this analysis.
From (c) we alsosee that for givensymmetric output levels, market prices
will decrease if goods become closer substitutes (¾ increases) or if the number
of ¯rms (n) increases.
Now we turn to the comparative static results with respect to n. Here we
consider two cases. First, the case where the new ¯rms that enter produce
only for the uninformed markets. In other words, n goes up but m does not
change as the new ¯rms enter. This implies that the new ¯rms are rather
small (produce low output levels). The second case derives the e®ect of n
whenall¯rms produce for boththe informed anduninformed market segment
(m ´ n).
Lemma 7 Changes in n have the following e®ects on the demand curve if
















To understand the e®ect of n on ¯, note that as n increases the number of
uninformed consumers (1¡¿) is spread more thinly over the ¯rms. A given
8rise in output by ¯rm i leads to a bigger rise in output per uninformed head.
Since the uninformed market has the faster decreasing marginal utility, such
an increase in output leads to a bigger fall in pi if n is higher.
Themaine®ect of an increase in n is that it decreases 1¡¿
n . The number of
uninformed consumers per ¯rm decreases. As we have just seen, an increase
in xi implies a decrease in xI
j. Because 1¡¿
n is smaller as n is larger, a given
reduction of xI
j leads to a bigger increase in the consumption per head of the
uninformed, xU




Finally, as n increases a given rise in output dx per ¯rm, leads to a bigger
rise in total output. Also, a given rise in i's output level and a given rise
in j's output level have a bigger e®ect on i's price because as n increases a
¯rm's uninformed market becomes smaller. All these e®ects cause a bigger
fall in pj in response to dx as n is bigger.
Up till now we have discussed the demand e®ects of parameter changes
of the market equilibrium prices, given the supply levels of output. But, of
course, output levels themselves will also be a®ected by these parameters. In
the next section, we consider the e®ects of the parameters when ¯rms choose
their output levels in Cournot Nash equilibrium. The additional e®ects that
we get in this case, we call competition e®ects.
3 Cournot Nash equilibrium
This section analyzes the equilibrium levels of output and price under the
assumption that ¯rms compete in quantities. As will be seen, an increase in
transparency, will increase ¯rms' output levels in the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium. In this sense transparency makes the market more competitive. This
e®ect is called the competition e®ect of transparency. It does not follow in
general though that prices will fall as a consequence. This is due to the
demand e®ect of transparency that we have seen in the previous section.
Let ¯rms have identical costs functions denoted by c(xj), with c0 ¸ 0 and
(unless explicitly stated otherwise) we assume c00 ¸ 0: Then pro¯ts functions
are




The ¯rst order conditions for the unique symmetric Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium (xN = xN
1 = ::: = xN
n and hence m = n by corollary 4) are
1 ¡ (2¯ +(n ¡ 1)°)xN ¡ c0(xN) = 0 (12)
9Note that the second order condition is
¡2¯ ¡ c
00(x
N) < 0 (13)





2¯ + °(n ¡ 1) + c00(xN)
d(2¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)
d¿
(14)
As derived in Lemma 6 (with m = n), we have
d(¯+(n¡1)°)
d¿ < 0 and
d¯
d¿ < 0,
for ¾ < 1 and ¿ < 1. Hence, we have
Proposition 8 If ¯rms have identical cost functions, there is a symmetric
Cournot Nash equilibrium where each ¯rm produces output level xN. Fur-




Firms increase their output levels if more consumers become informed
about available products and prices. This e®ect and its intuition are in line
with the conventional wisdom regarding competition on transparent (Inter-
net) markets. The competition between ¯rms becomes ¯ercer if the group of
informed consumers for which they compete becomes larger.
The competition e®ect of transparency can be dominated by the demand
e®ect of transparency, as the next result shows. Further, we consider the
competition e®ects of ¾ and n. In this result and other results below, we
condition on the value of c00(xN) which we think about in the following way.
















for some ³ between x and xN. Now if we change c00(³), keeping c0(xN) con-
stant, we stay inthe same Nash equilibrium. However, changes in parameters
will have di®erent e®ects depending on the value of c00(³). In this sense, we
can do comparative static analysis with the second derivative of the cost
function c(:).
Figure 1 makes the same point graphically. The downward sloping line
is the marginal revenue curve for the symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is
1 ¡ (2¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)x as a function of x. The solid upward sloping curve
is the marginal cost curve c0(x). The point where these two lines intersect
determines the Cournot Nash outcome xN. The dotted upward sloping curve
10is the cost curve with the same value for c0(xN), but di®erent value for the
second derivative around xN. Again, a small change in, say, ¿ shifts the
marginal revenue curve and the change in xN is then determined by the
value of c00(x) evaluated at x = xN.
Proposition 9 With ¾ < 1 we ¯nd the following e®ects on the symmetric



















< 0 if c
00(x
N) · (n ¡ 1)°
dpN
dn
< 0 if c
00(x
N) ¸ (n ¡ 1)°
This result gives su±cient conditions under which a rise in competition
through a rise in ¿;¾ or n reduces the Nash price. However, it also de-
rives su±cient conditions under which the demand e®ect of transparency
outweighs the competition e®ect. In that case, a rise in transparency raises
the Nash equilibrium price. To get this result, ¯rms' output levels should
be relatively unresponsive to the rise in transparency; that is, c00 should be




¾+n¡1, a rise in transparency causes a fall
in ° which, ceteris paribus, leads to a rise in the price level as well.
3.1 Transparency and consumer surplus
It is often assumed that consumers will bene¯t from a rise in transparency.
In this section we show that under the Cournot Nash assumption, consumer
welfare can be decreasing in transparency.
Since the equilibrium level of quantities xN is increasing in ¿ (see proposi-
tion 8), social welfare (de¯ned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus)
is also increasing in ¿. This can be seen as follows. Social welfare is here
de¯ned as consumer surplus minus production costs as a function of output
levels. The ¯rst derivative of welfare with respect to output of product i then
equals the marginal utility of good i minus the marginal cost of good i. In
this case, consumers' marginal utility of good i equals the price of good i. So
the sign of the derivative of welfare with respect to the output level of good
i, equals the sign of pi ¡ c0(xN
i ) which is positive under Cournot Nash.
11Furthermore, in those cases inwhich prices are decreasing in ¿, pro¯ts are
decreasing and consumer surplus is increasing in ¿. However, it is not nec-
essarily the case that consumers bene¯t from a rise in transparency. Again,
if supply is rather inelastic, consumers may loose, despite the fact that total
output increases.





















pixi + M · y
)
where we assume that each agent (whether informed or uninformed) has the
same income level y. Let uU
j denote the utility level of an uninformed agent










¯pjxj + M · y
ª
Then we have the following intuitive result.
Lemma 10 If xI
i > 0 for some good i, then uI > uU
k for some k 6= i.
The lemma implies that the informed agent is always better o® than the
uninformed agent who only consumes good k, if there is another good i 6= k
that the informed agent consumes in a positive amount. The proof of this
result is straightforward. Because xI
i > 0, a small increase in the price of
good i leads (by the envelope theorem) to a decrease in the utility of the
informed agent. Since the uninformed agent (who only knows good k) can
be viewed as facing a price of good i equal to +1, his utility level is strictly
lower than the informed agent's utility level.








with g0(:) > 0. We consider three cases for g(:) which di®er in the weight
assigned to the informed (high utility) and the uninformed (low utility) con-
sumers: (i) g(:) is linear (welfare is the sum of utilities), (ii) g(:) is concave (a
marginal change in utility of the uninformed has a bigger impact on welfare
thana change in the utility ofthe informed), and (iii) g(:) is convex (utility of
the informed has a bigger impact on welfare than utility of the uninformed).
As the next Proposition shows, in all three cases it is possible that welfare
falls with an increase in transparency.
12Proposition 11 Assume each ¯rm j has the same cost function c(xj) with
c0(:) > 0 and c00(:) ¸ 0. If c00(xN) is "big"




for each ¿ < ¿¤;




for each ¿ > ¿¤¤;




for each value of ¿.
The lemma shows that, irrespective of the shape of g(:), there always
exist situations in which a rise in ¿ leads to a fall in consumer surplus. The
intuition for this result is as follows. A rise in ¿ has two positive e®ects. First,
it raises total output as established in proposition 8. Second, it increases
the number of informed agents who have higher utility than the uninformed
agents, as established in lemma 10. The ¯rst positive e®ect canbe reducedto
zero by increasingc00(:) atthe Cournot Nashequilibrium. The second positive
e®ect is outweighed by the loss in utility of both informed and uninformed
agents. These agents lose utility, because the increase in the number of
informed agents raises demand for all goods and hence raises prices. If c(:)
is very convex, the competition e®ect of transparency is limited and welfare
can fall as ¿ rises.
3.2 Price dispersion
Above we have focussed on the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
For some parameter values there also exist asymmetric pure strategy equilib-
ria and mixed strategy equilibria. These equilibria involve price dispersion.
We will not give a complete characterization of the equilibria but proceed by
means of example. We will illustrate that it is not generally the case that an
increase in transparency will lead to a reduction in price dispersion.
In an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium there are m ¯rms (j =
1;:::;m) who sell to the informed consumers as well as to their own cap-
tive consumers and n ¡ m ¯rms (k = m + 1;:::;n) who sell only to their
13own captive consumers. For simplicity assume that all ¯rms face the cost
function c(xi) = 0. According to lemma 5 a ¯rm in the ¯rst group faces
demand function pj = 1¡ ¯xj ¡ °
Pm
i6=j;i=1xi: The ¯rst order condition for
¯rm j is 1 ¡ 2¯xj ¡ °
Pm
i6=j;i=1xi = 0. Symmetry among the ¯rst m ¯rms
then leads to xj = xm ´
1




2¯ + (m¡ 1)°
The ¯rms producing for their own uninformed consumers face demand func-
tion pk = 1¡ 2n






From Lemma 6 it follows that pm is decreasing in both ¿ and ¾ (see also
Proposition 9). At the same time we have pU > pm and pU independent of
both ¿ and ¾. Hence, as ¿ or ¾ increase the gap between pU and pm widens
and price dispersion increases.
For this to be an equilibrium, two conditions must be satis¯ed. Firstly,
the m¯rms producing for the informedshouldnot wantto switch to servicing
only their own uninformed consumers. Secondly, the n¡ m ¯rms producing
for their own uninformed consumers should not want to make the opposite
switch. To derive these two conditions for the general case is straightforward
but tedious. Therefore, as said, we proceed by means of example.
Consider the case n = 3;m = 2 and ¾ = 1.5 From ¯(1;¿;3jm = 2) =
°(1;¿;3jm = 2) = 6
2+¿; it follows that x1 = x2 = xm(1;¿;3;2) = 1
18(2+ ¿)
with corresponding pro¯ts ¼m = 1
54(2 + ¿): Furthermore, we have x3 =
1
12(1¡¿) and¼U = 1
24(1¡¿): For this to be an equilibrium, the ¯rst condition
is that ¼M ¸ ¼U, which requires ¿ ¸
1
13. The second condition is that
¯rm 3 does not want to switch to producing for the informed consumers.
In that case we would have °(1;¿;3jm = 3) = 2 and ¯rm 3 would have
demand function p3 = 1¡ 2(x1 +x2 +x3). Given x1 = x2 = xM the optimal
deviation for ¯rm 3 would be to produce x3 = xD =
1
36(5 ¡ 2¿) and earn
¼D(1;¿;3;2) = 1
648(5¡ 2¿)2. This pro¯t does not exceed ¼U if ¿ · 1
4. Hence
we have an asymmetric equilibrium if 1
13 · ¿ · 1
4. For the prices we ¯nd:
p1 = p2 = 1 ¡ ¯(x1 + x2) =
1







13 · ¿ ·
1
4, prices do not depend on ¿. However, this equilibrium
5It is straightforward to show that in any asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium we
must have m ¸ 2.
14can be slightly perturbed to generate an asymmetric equilibrium in which
price dispersion is increasing in ¿: For ¾ = 1 ¡ ², (products are almost but
not perfect substitutes), we have an asymmetric equilibrium for a similar
range of values of ¿. For this equilibrium we have p1 = p2 =
¯
2¯+° which
is decreasing in ¿ if ¾ < 1. At the same time, we have p1 = p2 < p3 = 3
4,
with p3 independent of ¿. Hence, the gap between p1 = p2 and p3 widens as
¿ increases locally. At some point, a further increase in ¿ will destroy the
asymmetric equilibrium. At that point, the fraction of informed consumers
becomes so large that ¯rm 3 is better o® serving these consumers as well,
rather than focussing on its own captive consumers (condition ¼D · ¼U will
be violated). We then enter the region in which the unique pure strategy
equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
The impact of transparency on prices and consumer surplus is more subtle
than conventional wisdom seems to suggest. In our model an increase in
transparency under some circumstances leads to an increase in prices, an
increase in price dispersion and a decrease in consumer surplus. These ef-
fects are due to, what we have called, the demand e®ect of transparency. If
goods are imperfect substitutes and consumers have a taste for variety, more
widespread information about the availability of goods wets consumers ap-
petite and shifts demand outward. This demand e®ect may counterbalance
the downward pressure on prices due the competition e®ect of transparency.
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6 Appendix: proofs














j which gives us (7). The only part of the Lemma that is not self-
evident is inequality (9). Substitution of pm = 1¡
2n

























































16Substitution in (15) gives us inequality (9).
Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 5
Let f1;2;:::;mgdenotethe set of ¯rms that produce on boththe informed
anduninformed market segments and fm+ 1;:::;ng the set of ¯rms that only
produce on the uninformed market segment. We start with the former group
of ¯rms.





n¿ +(1 ¡ ¿)(1¡ ¾)
xk ¡
¾(1¡ ¿)






Substituting into the expression for the price yields










n¿ + (1¡ ¾)(1¡ ¿)
xk ¡ [2¾ ¡
2(1¡ ¾)¾(1 ¡ ¿)








n¿ + (1¡ ¾)(1¡ ¿)
xk ¡ [
2n¾¿


















Inserting in the expression for pk gives
pk = 1¡
2(1¡ ¾)n
n¿ + (1¡ ¾)(1¡ ¿)
xk ¡
2n2¾¿




which corresponds to the expression in the Lemma.
Turning to the ¯rms fm+ 1;:::;ng we substitute xU
k = n
1¡¿xk into the
expression for the price for such a ¯rm k. Hence we get





For ease of later reference it is convenient to consider the symmetric case
where each ¯rm produces the same output level.
Lemma 12 If x1 = ::: = xm = x then the market equilibrium conditions (2)
and (3) yield the following expressions for xI
j = xI and xU




























Proof of lemma 6
¨E®ect of ¿ on ¯ and °.
Here it is convenient to start with
@°





(1¡ ¾)(1 +(m¡ 1)¾) ¡ (n + ¾ ¡1)(n ¡ 1¡ ¾(m ¡1))¿2
f[¿ (n ¡ 1+ ¾) +(1 ¡ ¾)][1+ (m¡ 1)¾(1¡ ¿) + ¿ (n ¡ 1)]g
2
Hence we ¯nd that
@°











In order to prove that
@¯
@¿ < 0, we consider two cases:
(i) if
@°





@¿ ¸ 0 then we prove by contradiction that
@¯
@¿ < 0: Suppose (by
contradiction) that there exist values of m;n (with m · n),¾ and ¿ such that
@¯
@¿ ¸ 0. Then choose x1 = ::: = xm = x > 0 and xm+1 = ::: = xn = ~ x such
that inequality (9) holds:
~ x <
mx










18and such that prices p1;:::;pm are positive. This is always possible by choos-









Hence for given value of x we ¯nd that @xU
@¿ < 0 and hence
@p
@¿ > 0 be-
cause p(xU) = 1 ¡ 2xU. Also in the symmetric case we have p(x) = 1 ¡
(¯ + (m¡ 1)°)x. Hence,
@p
@¿ > 0 for given x implies
@ (¯ + (m¡ 1)°)
@¿
< 0 (23)
Because inequalities (21) and (22) hold with strict inequality, we have
@m
@¿ = 0. Now
@°
@¿ ¸ 0 together with
@¯
@¿ ¸ 0 contradicts
@(¯+(m¡1)°)
@¿ < 0.
Hence it must be the case that
@¯
@¿ < 0. Using a similar argument, we can
rule out
@(¯+(m¡1)°)
@¿ > 0. This proves the result in line (c).
¨E®ect of ¾ on ¯ and °.




2(m¡ 1)n2¾(1¡ ¿)¿ [2+ (1 ¡ ¿)(m¡ 2)¾ +2(n ¡ 1)¿]
(1 + (m¡ 1)¾(1 ¡ ¿) + ¿ (n ¡ 1))
2(1¡ ¾ + (n +¾ ¡ 1)¿)
2 < 0






2 +(1 +(n ¡ 1)¿)
2
(1 +(m¡ 1)¾(1¡ ¿) +¿ (n¡ 1))
2(1 ¡ ¾ +(n + ¾ ¡ 1)¿)
2 > 0
In order to show that
@(¯+(m¡1)°)
@¾ > 0, we use again a proof by contradiction.
Suppose (by contradiction) that there exist values of m;n (with m · n),¾
and ¿ such that
@(¯+(m¡1)°)
@¾ < 0. Then choose x1 = ::: = xm = x > 0 and















19and such that prices p1;:::;pm are positive. This is always possible by choos-










@¾ > 0. Thenit follows from p(xU) = 1¡2xU that
@p
@¾ < 0.
Further, ina symmetric equilibrium we also ¯nd p(x) = 1¡(¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)x.
Then
@p
@¾ < 0 contradicts
@(¯+(m¡1)°)
@¾ < 0. Hence it must be the case that
@ (¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)
@¾
> 0
which proves the e®ect of ¾ in line (c) of the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 7
¨E®ect of n on ¯(¾;¿;n;m) and ° (¾;¿;n;m).













@n > 0 if ¿ < 1.
Then writing equation (11) as






@n > 0 if ¿ < 1. From this it also follows that
@(¯(¾;¿;n;m)+(m¡1)°(¾;¿;n;m))
@n > 0.
¨E®ect of n on ¯(¾;¿;n;n) and °(¾;¿;n;n).













@n > 0 if ¿ < 1 and ¾ < 1.
20Then writing equation (11) as










Proof of proposition 9
For the Cournot Nash price we have





xNd(¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)
d¿






2¯ + ° (n ¡1) + c00(xN)
£
"
¡(¯ + (n¡ 1)°)
d(2¯+(n¡1)°)
d¿ + £







































Hence we see that
dpN
d¿ > 0if c00(xN)¡(n ¡ 1)° > 0 and
@°
@¿ < 0. Also
dpN
d¿ < 0
if c00(xN) ¡ (n¡ 1)° < 0 and
@°
@¿ > 0. Using lemma 6 (c), the condition on
the sign of
@°

































Hence, a su±cient condition for
dpN
d¾ < 0 is c00(xN)¡ (n ¡ 1)° < 0.




Nd(¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)
dn | {z }
>0






where the sign of
dxN






2¯ +° (n ¡ 1)+ c00(xN)
d(2¯ + (n ¡ 1)°)
dn
< 0







2¯ + °(n ¡ 1)+ c00(xN)
£
·















2¯ + °(n ¡ 1)+ c00(xN)
£
· ¡
(n ¡1)° ¡ c00(xN)
¢ d¯













dn > 0 and
d°
dn > 0, we see that a su±cient condition for
dpN
dn < 0 is
(n ¡ 1)° ¡ c00(xN) < 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 11
















































22where we have used that the price for each good k equals pk = 1 ¡ 2xk ¡
2¾
P
j6=kxj. Hence we ¯nd
u






















Further, in a symmetric equilibrium we have from equations (20) and (18)
xU =







(1+ ¾(n ¡ 1))
xU






























We look at the terms (¤) and (¤¤) in turn.























(n ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾)




for some value ³ 2 huU;uIi. Because g(:) is either convex or concave, we also
¯nd that g0(³) lies between g0(uI) and g0(uU).
(¤¤): Writing xU as xU = nx
¿
(n¡1)(1¡¾)
1+¾(n¡1) +1, the term dxU








(n ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¾)









d¿ is close to zero because of the assumption that c00(xN) is big.






















1+ ¾(n ¡ 1)
=
(n ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾)











1+¾(n¡1)g0(uI) + (1¡ ¿)g0(uU)
i
¿ n








As notedabove, g0(³)lies between g0(uI) and g0(uU), henceone can choose
a value ~ ¿ so that the term labelled (¤¤¤) equals g0(³) and dW
d¿ < 0. Further,
if g(:) is concave, putting more weight on g0(uU) (i.e. choosing a lower value
of ¿ than ~ ¿) ensures that dW
d¿ < 0. Similarly, if g(:) is convex, putting more
weight on g0(uI) (i.e. choosing a higher value of ¿ than ~ ¿) ensures that
dW
d¿ < 0.




Figure 1: making costs c(x) more convex without 
changing the Nash equilibrium
c'(x)
c'(x) of more convex cost function
1-(2β+(n-1)γ)x
x xN
c'(xN)